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We study the effect of globalization on the volatility of wages and worker welfare in a model in which
risk is allocated through long-run employment relationships (the 'invisible handshake'). Globalization
can take two forms: International integration of commodity markets (i.e., free trade) and international
integration of factor markets (i.e., offshoring). In a two-country, two-good, two-factor model we show
that free trade and offshoring have opposite effects on rich-country workers. Free trade hurts rich-country
workers, while reducing the volatility of their wages; by contrast, offshoring benefits them, while raising
the volatility of their wages. We thus formalize, but also sharply circumscribe, a common critique
of globalization.
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A key feature of globalization in recent years, paralleling increases in trade ﬂows, has
been the striking increase in international labor-market integration. This is manifested both
in foreign direct investment, which allows a ﬁrm access to labor in several countries at once,1
and also in international oﬀshoring2 of business services.3
A parallel phenomenon has been the rise in income volatility for rich-country workers.
This was documented in Gottschalk, Moﬃtt, Katz and Dickens (1994) with much recent
evidence in Shin and Solon (2008) and Krishna and Senses (2008). Recent journalistic
accounts of rising economic insecurity among US workers with evidence from individual
case studies, survey data, and labor-market data are found in Gosselin (2004) and Hacker
(2004). By some measures, volatility of individual earnings in the United States has doubled
since the 1970’s. It should be underlined that this is not due merely to higher turnover or
restructuring of the economy, as workers in one sector lose jobs and workers in other sectors
gain them; Gottschalk et. al. (1994) show that a sharp rise in volatility can be observed
even among workers who do not change jobs. A key theme in many accounts of current
labor market trends is the claim that the nature of jobs has changed in such a way that jobs
are less secure, and the loyalty felt by employers to workers is weaker, than in previous eras,
1In the US case, employment both by inward and outward multinational operations has increased
markedly over the past generation. From 1977 to 2001, employment by majority-owned US aﬃliates of
foreign companies grew by 4.7 million, and employment by foreign aﬃliates of US ﬁrms grew by 2.8 million
(Mataloni (2004, pp. 53-54)). During this period employment by nonbank foreign aﬃliates grew from 1.7
percent to 5.6 percent of US employment (Zeile (2003, p.45)).
2To clarify, in this paper ‘oﬀshoring’ refers to the hiring of workers in one country by an employer in a
diﬀerent country, a practice sometimes called ‘outsourcing’ in the popular press.
3Amiti and Wei (2006), for example, note that oﬀshoring of business services by US manufacturers grew
by 6.3 percent per annum in the 1990’s.
1with globalization and oﬀshoring often cited as a causal inﬂuence.4,5
We ask in this paper if it is possible that these phenomena may indeed be related, that
is, if greater international integration may lead to greater volatility of wages by weakening
employment relationships.
We explore this in the context of a simple model of risk-bearing in employment rela-
tionships in which complete contracts are unavailable for informational reasons. In this
environment, the only way for an employer to share risk with a worker is to develop a long-
run relationship in which the ﬁrm promises to smooth out (partially or completely) shocks
to wages, and the worker in turn promises a long-run commitment to the ﬁrm. Such implicit
contracts, often called the ‘invisible handshake,’ are enforceable only through the threat
that if one reneges, he or she will lose the beneﬁt of the trust on which the relationship was
founded, and will need to suﬀer the whims of the market and search for a new worker (or
employer, as the case may be). Integration of one’s country’s labor market with another
can make it easier or harder to search for a worker, thus respectively reducing or increasing
the potential for risk-sharing relationships, and thus increasing or reducing the volatility of
wages as the case may be.
4For example, sociologist Richard Sennett has described “the ‘casualization’ of the labor force” he has
observed in interviews with workers over a thirty-year period (Sennett (2006, p. 48), accompanied by a
decline in trust and loyalty in worker-employer relations (pp. 63-72). Journalistic accounts echoing these
observations are common; see, for example, Uchitelle (2006, chapter 2) for a history of the rise and fall of
long-run implicit contracts between employers and workers in the US labor market. Uchitelle argues that
trade pressures of the 1970’s were a major inﬂuence in their demise. See also Meyerson (2006), Levine (2006),
Uchitelle (2005), and Holstein (2005) for similar views.
5These themes loom large in popular opinion, as well. For example, in a recent poll by Greenberg Quinlan
Rosner Research (2004), 63% of respondents were ‘very concerned’ or ‘extremely concerned’ about ‘global
economic competition and the outsourcing of American jobs’ (p.6). Further, 46% called it the most important
or second most important issue concerning them (p.5). The respondents were only slightly more worried
about the Iraq war.
2Here we will comment brieﬂy on related work and then on the distinctive features of our
approach.
Related work. The literature on international oﬀshoring has followed several strands.
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) analyze the allocation of tasks within a complex production
process between a skill-abundant home country and a skill-poor foreign country. They show
that movement of capital to the foreign country leads to a rise in the number of tasks
allocated to foreign workers (‘oﬀshoring’), while at the same time increasing the relative
demand for skilled labor in both countries, a hypothesis borne out by the data. Later analyses
of equilibrium international oﬀshoring, such as Grossman and Helpman (2005), have been
built on incomplete-contracting models; Spencer (2005) provides a survey. Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2006) show how oﬀshoring tasks can confer a productivity beneﬁt that can
boost domestic wages, and Antr` as, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) employ a matching
model with heterogeneous workers to examine the eﬀects of oﬀshoring on income distribution
within both countries. Mitra and Ranjan (2007) look at the implications for unemployment,
showing that general equilibrium eﬀects of oﬀshoring can be paradoxical and quite beneﬁcial
for domestic workers.
None of these approaches addresses issues of risk, and so none can shed light on the rising
volatility of workers’ incomes – particularly within a job, as seen in the data. In contrast,
we are able to do so by drawing on the economics of implicit contracts in the labor market.
The importance of such contracts has been well documented empirically; see Beaudry and
DiNardo (1991) and McDonald and Worswick (1999) for pioneering work, and Malcomson
(1999, section 3) for a survey. Matusz (1985, 1986) explores implicit labor contracts in trade
models, but with a diﬀerent focus from this paper. His papers feature enforceable contracts
and risk-averse workers with indivisible labor supply, resulting in rigid wages with positive
rates of equilibrium unemployment.
This paper is related to an earlier one by McLaren and Newman (2004), which studied
3the eﬀect of globalization on risk-sharing in an abstract economy with symmetric agents.
Here, by contrast, the asymmetry between workers and employers is the focus, as well as
the distribution of income between workers and employers. In addition, that paper, unlike
the current paper, conﬁned attention to stationary risk-sharing relationships, which are in
general sub-optimal. Moreover, the two-good setup of the present paper allows us to analyze
the eﬀects of free trade, which was not possible with the earlier paper. See Kocherlakota
(1996) for an extensive analysis of optimal history-dependant risk-sharing relationships. The
argument is also related to the literature initiated by Ramey and Watson (2001), showing
how improvements in search technology can have perverse eﬀects on incentives.
This exercise is also close in spirit to Thomas and Worrall (1988).6 They analyze self-
enforcing labor contracts between a risk-neutral employer and a risk-averse employee in the
presence of an exogenous and randomly ﬂuctuating labor spot market. The employer oﬀers
wage smoothing to the employee, implying wages above the spot wage in slumps; in return
the worker accepts a wage below the spot market in booms. Both sides know that if either
reneges on this agreement, both will be forced to use the spot market from then on. The
presence of the spot market generally puts a binding constraint on the amount of insurance
the employer can provide. By contrast, in this paper, the real wage in the spot-market
sector is determined endogenously by general-equilibrium considerations and in particular
is aﬀected by globalization. Further, the value of entering the search pool (which is also
the spot-market sector) is endogenous, since it depends on how easy it is to ﬁnd a match
and also on how well cooperation works with the new partner once a match has been found.
Thus, this is a general equilibrium exercise, while the Thomas and Worrall model is partial
equilibrium in character. The aim is to ask how an increase in international openness would
6Our approach to ﬁnding the optimal contract with a risk-averse worker follows that paper. It should
be pointed out that this project adds moral hazard, raising issues studied, for example, in MacLeod and
Malcomson (1989).
4aﬀect wage-smoothing within the ﬁrm.
This eﬀect of globalization on wage volatility has been explored in various forms. For
example, Rodrik (1997, chapter 2), in the course of a wide-ranging review of the risk eﬀects
of globalization, pointed out that globalization can change labor demand elasticities in such
a way that the variance of spot wages is increased, an observation that has generated sub-
stantial subsequent work.7 This approach assumes away risk-sharing institutions implicitly.
By contrast, we focus on how risk-sharing mechanisms, such as implicit labor contracts,
which are endogenously imperfect, can themselves be aﬀected by globalization.
An approach much more closely related to ours is Bertrand (2004). In her model, ﬁrms hit
with stiﬀ import competition have an increased risk of bankruptcy; a ﬁrm whose probability
of bankruptcy is high has eﬀectively a higher discount rate, and thus a diminished ability
to promise wage-smoothing credibly. This leads to higher wage volatility within a given
employment relationship. The eﬀect is shown to have strong empirical support in US data.
Our approach. Our model is highly stylized, which is a necessity in order to treat optimal
implicit contracts in an open-economy general equilibrium model. Once the logic of this
stylized model is understood, it is not diﬃcult to see what would happen in a more realistic
and complicated extension. In our model, workers are risk-averse, while the employers are
risk-neutral. There are two sectors, a ‘careers sector’ in which production is risky and requires
unobservable eﬀort by a worker and by an employer, and a ‘spot market sector’ with risk-free
Ricardian technology. An employer in the ‘careers sector’ would like to commit credibly to a
constant wage, in eﬀect selling insurance at the same time as it purchases labor, but without
enforceable contracts it can do so only by reputational means, and so is constrained by its
incentive-compatibility constraints.
Workers seeking a career-sector job and employers seeking an employee search until they
7Traca (2005) oﬀers an elegant general-equilibrium formalization along these lines, and Scheve and Slaugh-
ter (2004) summarize some of the empirical work that has followed.
5have a match. Because of the need to elicit eﬀort, wage compensation in the ‘careers sector’
is ‘back-loaded’ in equilibrium; a worker puts in eﬀort today in order to earn compensation
that will be due to her tomorrow. This is the same principle analyzed by Lazear (1979) in
his analysis of mandatory retirement: When non-contractible eﬀort must be elicited from
a worker, it is generally optimal to promise workers wages that increase over time, so that
fear of losing high future wages deters shirking. This implies that senior workers receive
quasi-rents from their employer. In Lazear’s analysis, this motivates the use of mandatory
retirement. Shleifer and Summers (1988) show that the same principle can motivate hostile
takeovers, if an acquiring ﬁrm is not bound by the commitments made by the incumbent
employer to pay the promised high wages to the senior workers. In our paper, we show that
this same principle can motivate increased variance of wages as a result of oﬀshoring.
Because of this back-loading of wages, in the ‘careers sector,’ new workers are always
cheaper than incumbent ones. This is the source of the ﬁrm’s problem: During adverse
shocks, when the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability is low, if it has promised to pay the same high wage as
in good states, it will be tempted to renege, dumping the current worker and picking up a
new, cheaper one instead. If it is easy to ﬁnd a new worker quickly, workers will therefore
know not to trust an employer’s promise of wage insurance, and, expecting a low wage in
bad times, they will demand a high wage in good times. Thus, if it is easy to ﬁnd a new
worker, an employer that makes only credible promises will promise a low wage in bad states
and a high wage in good states, implying a high variance of wages in equilibrium.
There are two countries, which diﬀer only in their ratios of workers to employers. Glob-
alization can take two forms: Free trade, or integration of goods markets, and oﬀshoring,
or integration of labor markets.8 From the point of view of the labor-scarce economy, free
8Obviously, international oﬀshoring can be modelled in many diﬀerent ways. One approach is to assume
a complex production process, requiring many tasks, some of which can be performed abroad, as in Feenstra
and Hanson (1996) or Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006). Changes in the environment can then raise the
6trade pushes down the price of labor-intensive ‘spot-market-sector’ output, which makes
labor cheaper and also loosens employers’ incentive-compatibility constraints, lowering the
variance of wages. On the other hand, oﬀshoring, by making it easier for a ﬁrm in a labor-
scarce economy to hire workers, reduces the amount of wage insurance that can be credibly
promised, raising the variance of wages in the careers sector. At the same time oﬀshoring
creates eﬃciencies in matching workers to employers that spill over, in general equilibrium,
to beneﬁt workers as consumers, raising real incomes for workers worldwide.9 Thus, free
trade reduces the volatility of rich-country wages, but makes rich-country workers worse oﬀ;
oﬀshoring raises the volatility of rich-country wages, but makes rich-country workers better
oﬀ. We thus formalize, but also sharply circumscribe, a common critique of globalization:
Oﬀshoring can indeed weaken the invisible handshake, raising the volatility of rich-country
wages, but general equilibrium eﬀects raise expected wages by more than enough to compen-
sate.
The model can shed light on a number of empirical ﬁndings. First, as mentioned above,
Bertrand (2004) showed that US workers whose sector of employment saw a rise in import
penetration tended to see a rise in wage volatility compared to other sectors, which she
interpreted as a response to an increased probability of bankruptcy. In our paper, we show
that exactly the same eﬀects can be obtained in a model without bankruptcy (and of course
fraction of tasks done abroad. These can be thought of as models of partially-integrated labor markets; a rise
in the degree of integration leads to more oﬀshoring. In this paper, we simplify the treatment of oﬀshoring
by assuming that labor markets across borders are either completely segmented or completely integrated;
oﬀshoring is a move from the former to the latter. This simpliﬁcation allows us to focus on the richness of
the implicit contracts. It is clear that one could model oﬀshoring with partially integrated labor markets so
as to capture the same sort of eﬀects, at the cost of greater complexity.
9There is strong empirical support for eﬀects of this sort. Amiti and Wei (2006) show that US manu-
facturing sectors that were in a better position during the 1990’s to take advantage of international service
oﬀshoring showed sharply better productivity gains than other sectors. This would, of course, be likely to
lead to declines in the prices of output for those sectors as required by the story outlined here.
7we analyze the eﬀects of both oﬀshoring and trade in general equilibrium).10 This is also
broadly consistent with more recent ﬁndings by Krishna and Senses (2008), although the
match is not as close because that paper shows that the permanent component of income
volatility is higher for workers in industries with larger increases in import penetration (and
the data are not limited to workers who do not change jobs). Second, we can (subject to
parameter values) rationalize a rise in economy-wide average wage volatility as a result of
globalization, as documented by Gottschalk, et. al. (1994), Gosselin (2004) and Hacker
(2004). Third, Scheve and Slaughter (2004) have shown that British workers in sectors with
more multinational activity are signiﬁcantly more prone to doubt their economic security
than those in other sectors – even if the multinational activity takes the form of inward
foreign direct investment. Thus, it appears that labor market integration raises workers’
perceptions of risk in a way that has nothing to do with the possibility of losing one’s job to
a foreign worker. Scheve and Slaughter suggest that the presence of multinationals raises the
elasticity of labor demand, thus raising the variance of wages for given variance of shocks;
however, as noted above, this ‘elasticity’ interpretation assumes away the possibility of risk-
sharing institutions between workers and employers, which themselves can be aﬀected by
globalization. In this paper, such institutions, namely the ‘invisible handshake,’ are the
focus, and we show that the endogenous response of those institutions to globalization can
themselves oﬀer an explanation of the Scheve and Slaughter ﬁndings.
We present the formal model in the next section. In the following sections we characterize
10Bertrand (2004) shows a positive correlation between a sector’s import penetration and wage volatility
in that sector (measured as sensitivity of a worker’s wage to current labor-market conditions). Strictly
speaking, our model has only one sector with implicit contracts, the ‘careers sector,’ and it is an export
sector (hence has negative import penetration). However, it is easy to see that if we had multiple careers
sectors, with a role for the invisible handshake in each one, but the US had a comparative advantage in
some but not others, then clearly wage volatility in those sectors with a comparative disadvantage would be
increased by opening up trade and vice versa. This would be exactly as in Bertrand’s empirical ﬁndings.
8optimal wage contracts, derive the conditions under which those contracts will exhibit volatile
wages, and study the comparative statics of wage volatility. Then, in the ﬁnal section, we
show how the general equilibrium is changed by free trade and oﬀshoring.
2. The Model
We analyze the questions at hand with a two-good, two-country, two-factor general equi-
librium model. In this section, we will describe the key features of the closed-economy version
in detail; we will treat the two-country version later.
(i) Production.
Consider ﬁrst a closed-economy model with two types of agent, ‘workers,’ of which there
are a measure L, and ‘employers,’ of which there are a measure E. There are two sectors. A
risk-free sector, Y , uses only workers, each of whom produces one unit of output per period
employed in the sector. This is what was called the ‘spot-market sector’ in the introduction.
A second sector, X, which will serve as a numeraire sector, employs both employers and
workers. This is what was called the ‘careers sector’ in the introduction. In order for
production to occur in this sector, one worker must team up with one employer. We will call
a given such partnership a ‘ﬁrm.’ In each period, X production requires that a worker and
employer must both put in one unit of non-contractible eﬀort. Workers suﬀer a disutility
from eﬀort equal to k > 0, while employers suﬀer no such disutility. (Adding a disutility
for employers would add to the notation without substantively changing results.) Within a
given ﬁrm, denote the eﬀort put in by agent i by ei ∈ {0,1}, where i = W indicates the
worker and i = E denotes the employer. The output generated in that period is then equal
to R = xeWeE, where  is an idiosyncratic iid random variable that takes the value  = G
or B with respective probabilities π, where πG + πB = 1 and xG > xB > 0. The variable 
indicates whether the current period is one with a good state or a bad state for the ﬁrm’s
9proﬁtability. Of course, since X is the numeraire, output and revenue are equal. The average
revenue is denoted by x ≡ πGxG + πBxB.
Production in the Y sector is straightforward. Each worker in that sector produces one
unit of output per period, receiving an income of ωy. Since this is a constant-returns-to-scale
sector with only one factor, we must have ωy = py > 0, where py is the price of Y -sector
output.
(ii) Search.
Workers seeking an X-sector employer and X-sector employers seeking a worker search
until they have a match. Search follows a speciﬁcation of a type used extensively by Pissarides
(2000). If a measure n of workers and a measure m of employers search in a given period,
then Φ(n,m) matches occur, where Φ is a concave function increasing in all arguments and
homogeneous of degree 1, with Φ(n,m) ≤ min(n,m) and Φnm = Φmn > 0 ∀ n,m. It is
convenient to denote by QE the steady-state probability that a vacancy will be ﬁlled in any
given period, or in other words, QE =
Φ(n,m)
m , where n and m are set at their steady-state
values. Similarly, denote by QW =
Φ(n,m)
n the steady-state probability that a searching worker
will ﬁnd an X-sector job in any given period. Search has no direct cost, but for those who
are currently in X-sector ﬁrms it does have an opportunity cost: If an agent is searching for
a new partner, then she is unable to put in eﬀort for production with her existing partner.
On the other hand, for workers in the Y sector, there is no opportunity cost to search.11
Note that since a worker can produce Y without an employer, and can search simultane-
ously, any worker not currently in an X-sector ﬁrm produces Y .
There is also a possibility in each period that a worker and employer who have been
together producing X output in the past will be exogenously separated from each other.
11Thus, the X-sector jobs are more challenging jobs that require a worker’s full attention, while Y -sector
jobs are more casual, and permit a worker to earn an income while searching for something else. Adding an
opportunity cost to search in the Y sector would add complexity without adding anything of real importance.
10This probability is given by a constant (1 − ρ) ∈ (0,1).
(iii) Preferences.
There is no storage, saving or borrowing, so an agent’s income in a given period is equal
to that agent’s consumption in that period.
Employers. All employers have the same linear homogeneous quasi-concave per-period
utility function, U(cX,cY), deﬁned over consumption cX and cY of goods X and Y , respec-
tively. This yields indirect utility function v(I,px,py) = I
Γ(px,py), where I denotes income;
px and py denote the prices of the two goods respectively; and Γ is a linear homogenous
function that generates the consumer price index derived from the utility function U. (In
other words, Γ(px,py) is the minimum expenditure required to obtain unit utility with prices
px and py.) Recalling that X is our numeraire sector, we have px ≡ 1, and it is convenient
to write the consumer price index as P(py) ≡ Γ(1,py). Note that by Shephard’s Lemma, the
elasticity of P(py) with respect to py is equal to good Y ’s share in consumption.
Workers. All workers have the same per-period utility function µ(U(cX,cY)) over con-
sumption of goods X and Y . The function µ is a strictly increasing and strictly concave
von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Thus, using the notation developed just above,
if in a given period a worker receives a wage ω and faces a consumer price index of P = P(py),
then the worker’s utility for that period is given by µ( ω
P).
In other words, workers are risk-averse and employers are risk-neutral, but both will
exhibit the same demand behavior for a given income.
(iv) Goods market clearing.
In each period, the total amount of each good produced must equal the amount consumed.
Since given the relative price py both workers and employers will consume X and Y in the
same proportions, this amounts to the condition that py =
U2(1,r)
U1(1,r), where the subscripts
denote partial derivatives, and r denotes the ratio of Y production to X production.12 In
12Obviously, in the closed-economy version of the model r will refer to the ratio of domestic Y and X
11other words, the relative price must be equal to the marginal rate of substitution between
the two goods determined by the production ratio. We assume that U2(1,r) → ∞ as r → 0,
and U1(1,r) → ∞ as r → ∞, which (given that U is quasi-concave and hence the marginal
rate of substitution is strictly decreasing in r) implies a unique, market-clearing value of
py ∈ (0,∞) for any r ∈ (0,∞). Further, py is strictly decreasing in r.
(v) Sequence of events.
The sequence of events within each period is as follows. (i) Any existing matched employer
and worker in the X sector learn whether or not they will be exogenously separated this
period. (ii) The proﬁtability state  for each X-sector ﬁrm is realized. Within a given
employment relationship, this is immediately common knowledge. The value of  is not
available to any agent outside of the ﬁrm, however. (iii) The wage, if any, is paid (a claim
on the ﬁrm’s output at the end of the period). (iv) The employer and worker simultaneously
choose their eﬀort levels ei. At the same time, the search mechanism operates. Within
an X-sector ﬁrm, if ei = 0, then agent i can participate in search. At the same time, all
Y -sector workers search. (v) Each X-sector ﬁrm’s revenue, R, is realized, and proﬁts and
consumption are realized.13 (vi) For those agents who have found a new potential partner in
this period’s search, new partnerships with a new self-enforcing agreement are formed. This
is achieved by a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer made by the employer to the worker.
production, while in the open-economy version the world output ratio will be the relevant variable.
13Strictly speaking, there is the possibility, oﬀ of the equilibrium path, that the ﬁrm’s output will be zero
because one or the other party has shirked, raising the question of how the wage claim issued in sub-period
(iii) can be redeemed. This issue could be eliminated by assuming that, rather than zero output, the employer
is able to produce some positive output, say, xmin > 0, even without a worker. The wages can be paid out of
that output at the end of the period. The interpretation of xG and xB is, then, the additional output that
is produced in cooperation with a non-shirking worker. This would require carrying this additional piece of
notation throughout the analysis and would increase the total amount of good X produced, but would not
change any of our qualitative results.
12We will focus on steady-state equilibria. In such an equilibrium, the expected lifetime
discounted proﬁt of an employer with vacancy is denoted V ES and the expected lifetime
discounted utility of a searching worker is denoted V WS, where the ‘S’ indicates the state
of searching. Similarly, we can denote by V ER and V WR the lifetime payoﬀs to employers
and workers respectively evaluated at the beginning of a cooperative X-sector relationship.
Naturally, we must have V WR ≥ V WS in equilibrium, or no worker will accept an X-sector
job. The values V ij are endogenous, as they are aﬀected by the endogenous probability of
ﬁnding a match in any given period and by the endogenous value of entering a relationship
once a match has been found. However, any employer will take them as given when designing
the wage agreement. We can write:
V WS = µ(ωy
P ) + QWρβV WR + QW(1 − ρ)βV WS + (1 − QW)βV WS, and
V ES = QEρβV ER + QE(1 − ρ)βV ES + (1 − QE)βV ES.
(1)
The Y -sector worker’s payoﬀ from search is the current Y -sector wage plus the continuation
values if the worker ﬁnds X-sector work and is not immediately separated, ﬁnds X-sector
work and is immediately separated, or fails to ﬁnd X-sector work. The payoﬀ from search for
an X-sector employer with vacancy is given by the continuation value if the employer ﬁnds
a worker who is not immediately separated, ﬁnds a worker who is immediately separated,
or fails to ﬁnd a worker. If an X-sector worker, or an X-sector employer who already has a
worker, chooses to search, the payoﬀ will be the same as in (1), except for a straightforward
change in the ﬁrst-period payoﬀ.
Given those values, a self-enforcing agreement between a worker and an employer is
simply a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game that they play together. We assume that
the employer has all of the bargaining power, so the agreement chosen is simply the one that
gives the employer the highest expected discounted proﬁt, subject to incentive constraints
(we discuss brieﬂy the consequences of relaxing this assumption in footnote 24, Section 6).
Without loss of generality, we will assume that the ‘grim punishment’ is used, meaning here
13that if either agent defects from the agreement at any time, the relationship is severed and
both agents must search for new partners. Thus, the payoﬀ following a deviation would be
V ES for an employer and V WS for a worker.
To sum up, risk-neutral employers search for risk-averse workers, and when they ﬁnd each
other, the employer oﬀers the worker the proﬁt-maximizing self-enforcing wage contract,
which then remains in force until one party reneges or the two are exogenously separated.
This pattern provides a steady ﬂow of workers and employers into the search pool, where
they receive endogenous payoﬀs V WS and V ES. These values then act as parameters that
constrain the optimal wage contract.
The analysis will proceed as follows. We will characterize optimal labor contracts in the
X sector. It turns out that optimal contracts are very much aﬀected by the values of py and
QE. We will show how they change as we vary py and QE exogenously, and then we will show
how py and QE are determined endogenously, to complete the general equilibrium analysis.
We then will examine how these two values change with international integration of: (i)
goods markets, and then (ii) labor markets, to see how the behavior of wages is aﬀected by
globalization.
We ﬁrst turn to the form of optimal contracts.
3. The form of optimal contracts in the X sector
In general, optimal incentive-constrained agreements in problems of this sort can be quite
complex because the speciﬁed actions depend on the whole history of shocks and not only
the current one. (See Thomas and Worrall (1988) and Kocherlakota (1996).) In analyzing
the equilibrium, it is useful to note that in our model the employment contracts oﬀered by
employers always take one of two very simple forms, which we will call ‘wage smoothing’ and
‘wage volatility.’ Derivation of this property is the purpose of this section.
14The equilibrium can be characterized as the solution to a recursive optimization problem.
Denote by Ω(W) the highest possible expected present discounted proﬁt the employer can
receive in a subgame-perfect equilibrium, conditional on the worker receiving an expected
present discounted payoﬀ of at least W. Arguments parallel to those in Thomas and Worrall
(1988) can be used to show that Ω is deﬁned on an interval [Wmin,Wmax] and is decreasing,
strictly concave, and diﬀerentiable, where Wmin and Wmax are respectively the lowest and
highest worker payoﬀs consistent with a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game played by


































Wmin ≤ f W ≤ Wmax, and (6)
ω ≥ 0. (7)
The right-hand side of (2) is the maximization problem solved by the employer. She
must choose a current-period wage ω for each state , and a continuation utility f W for the
worker for subsequent periods following that state. Constraint (3) is the employer’s incentive
compatibility constraint: If this is not satisﬁed in state , then the employer will in that state
prefer to renege on the promised wage, understanding that this will cause the worker to lose
faith in the relationship and sending both parties into the search pool. Constraint (4) is the
worker’s incentive compatibility constraint. The left-hand side is the worker’s payoﬀ from
15putting in eﬀort in the current period, collecting the wage, and continuing the relationship.14
The right-hand side is the payoﬀ from shirking and searching, in which case the worker’s
payoﬀ is the same as it would be if she were in the Y sector except that in the current
period her income is ω instead of ωy. If this constraint is not satisﬁed, the worker will prefer
to shirk by searching instead of working.15 Constraint (5) is the target-utility constraint.
In the ﬁrst period of an employment relationship, the employer must promise at least as
much of a payoﬀ to the worker as remaining in the search pool would provide. Thus, in
that case, denoting the target utility at the beginning of the relationship by W0, we have
W = W0 = V WS (and so V ER = Ω(V WS)). Thereafter, the employer will in general be
bound by promises of payoﬀs she had made to the worker in the past. Finally, (6) and (7)
are natural bounds on the choice variables.
Constraint (4) can be replaced by the more convenient form:
f W > f W
∗, where f W
∗ ≡
[1 − (1 − ρ)β]V WS − µ(ωy
P ) + k
ρβ
. (4)0
The value f W ∗ is the minimum future utility stream that must be promised to the worker in
order to convince the worker to incur eﬀort and forgo search. Given that V WS ≤ V WR in
equilibrium, it is easy to see from (1) that f W ∗ > V WS.
Let the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier for (3) be denoted by ψ, the multiplier for (4)0 by υ, and
14Note that we are assuming that a worker cannot receive a Y -sector wage while searching if that worker
is shirking on an X-sector job. This makes sense if, for example, eﬀort is not observable and third-party
veriﬁable but physical presence on the job site is, and a worker can search while physically at the X-sector
job site but cannot produce Y -sector output while there. Thus, an X-sector employer would be able to sue
to recover the wage just paid if the worker was absent, working another job, instead of on site at the location
of the X ﬁrm.
15Throughout, we will assume that it is optimal to induce the worker to exert eﬀort in each state as long
as the employment relationship continues. This is clearly the case in a substantial portion of the parameter
space, and so we are implicitly restricting attention to that portion. We will comment in footnote 20, Section
6 on the parameter restrictions implicit in this assumption.
16the multiplier for (5) by λ. The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to ω and f W ∗ respectively
are:






0(f W) + ρβψΩ
0(f W) + ρβλπ + υ ≤ 0 (9)
(Condition (8) is an inequality to allow for the possibility that ω = 0 at the optimum, and
(9) is an inequality to allow for the possibility that f W = Wmin at the optimum. It is easy
to verify that f W = Wmax is never an optimal choice, and so we will ignore that case.)
The following lemma is proven in the appendix:
Lemma 1. Wmin = V WS.
Proof. See appendix.
In other words, it is feasible for the employer to push the worker’s payoﬀ down to the
opportunity payoﬀ at the beginning of the employment relationship. Since it is in the interest
of the employer to do so, Lemma 1 makes clear that workers joining X-sector employment
receive the same payoﬀ that they would receive in the Y sector, or in other words, V WR =







16Formally, note that if the target-utility constraint (5) does not bind in the ﬁrst period, so that the
worker’s utility exceeds V WS, then λ = 0, and (8) cannot bind with any positive wage. Therefore, the
ﬁrst-period wage will be equal to zero in both states. Then, by Lemma 1, if (5) does not bind, then the
lower bound of (6) will not bind either, and so (9) will hold with equality; with λ = 0, this implies υ > 0,
which in turn implies that f W = f W∗ in both states. Substituting this with the zero ﬁrst-period wages into
the left-hand side of (5) shows that the worker’s payoﬀ will be below V WS, a contradiction.
17Of course, this implies that, in equilibrium, Y -sector workers are indiﬀerent between searching and not
searching, so if a small search cost were imposed, there would be no search (this is a version of the Diamond
search paradox). However, this feature would disappear if any avenue were opened up to allow workers to
capture some portion of X-sector rents. For example, for simplicity, we have assumed that employers have
17and (4)0 can be rewritten as:
f W > f W









Further, since f W ∗ > V WS, Lemma 1 tells us that (6) is redundant, so it will be ignored
henceforth. As a result, (9) will always hold with equality.
To sum up, in each period the employer maximizes (2), subject to (3), (4)00, (5), and (7).
In the ﬁrst period of the relationship, the worker’s target utility W = W0 is given by V WS,
but in the second period it is determined by the values of f W chosen in the ﬁrst period and
by the ﬁrst-period state, and similarly in later periods it is determined by choices made at
earlier dates. We impose an assumption:
Assumption 1. In the ﬁrst period of an employment relationship, the employer’s incentive-
compatibility constraint (3) does not bind in either state.
We will discuss suﬃcient conditions for this later (in footnote 20 of Section 6). We can
now prove that under Assumption 1, the equilibrium always takes the same simple form: A
one-period ‘apprenticeship’ in which the Y -sector wage ωy is paid, followed by a time- and
history-invariant but perhaps state-dependent wage. The key idea is that it is never optimal
to promise more future utility than is required to satisfy the worker’s incentive constraint
(4)00, so after the ﬁrst period of the relationship, the worker’s target utility is always equal
to f W ∗. This means that after the ﬁrst period, the optimal wage settings by the ﬁrm are
stationary. We can now establish a detailed proof through the following two propositions.
all of the bargaining power, but this could be relaxed. In addition, we have assumed that k is common
knowledge, but it would be reasonable to assume that diﬀerent workers have diﬀerent values of k, and while
employers know the distribution of this parameter, they do not know any given worker’s value of it. Either of
these modiﬁcations would very substantially increase the complexity of the model, but would give X workers
some portion of the rents and thus avoid the Diamond paradox.
18Proposition 1. Consider the ﬁrst period of an employment relationship. If the employer’s
incentive-compatibility constraint does not bind in either state, the ﬁrst-period wage is set
equal to ωy in each state and the continuation payoﬀ for the worker in each state is set equal
to f W ∗.
Proof. Suppose, ﬁrst, that the worker’s incentive compatibility constraint does not bind
in state  in the ﬁrst period. Then υ = 0, and since ψ = 0 because of Assumption 1, (9)
becomes:
Ω
0(f W) + λ = 0.
(Recall that as seen in the proof of Lemma 1, (9) holds with equality). Since by the envelope
theorem, Ω0(W0) = −λ, this and the concavity of Ω imply that f W ≤ W0 = V WS. But
since V WS < f W ∗, this implies that the worker’s incentive compatibility constraint (4)00 will
be violated, a contradiction. Therefore, the worker’s incentive compatibility constraint must
bind in each state, ensuring that f W = f W ∗. Given that f W = f W ∗ and W0 = V WS, the target
utility constraint (5) is exactly satisﬁed by setting the wage in each state in the ﬁrst period
equal to ωy. Therefore, ωy is the minimum ﬁrst period wage required to make the worker
willing to accept the job. The condition (8), with ψ = 0, then ensures that it is indeed
optimal to pay the same wage in both states. Q.E.D.
Now we can use the fact that the worker’s target utility for the second period of the
relationship (denoted as W in (2)) is equal to f W ∗ to characterize the equilibrium from that
point forward.
Proposition 2. Under the conditions stated for Proposition 1, there is a pair of values
ω∗
 for  = G,B such that in the second period and all subsequent periods of an X-sector
employment relationship regardless of history (provided neither partner has shirked), the
19wage ω∗
 is paid whenever the state is . In addition, the worker’s continuation payoﬀ is
always equal to f W ∗. Further, after the ﬁrst period there are three possible cases:
(i) The employer’s incentive compatibility constraint (3) never binds, and ω∗
G = ω∗
B.
(ii) The employer’s incentive compatibility constraint (3) binds in the bad states but not
in the good states, and ω∗
G > ω∗
B.





As a result, we need concern ourselves with only two types of possible equilibrium wage
contracts: The type that features ω∗
G = ω∗
B after the ﬁrst period, which we will call wage-
smoothing agreements; and the type with ω∗
G > ω∗
B after the ﬁrst period, which we will call
ﬂuctuating-wage agreements.
To sum up, if the employer’s incentive constraint does not bind, the worker goes through
an ‘apprenticeship period’ at the beginning of the relationship, followed by a constant wage.
If the employer’s constraint ever binds, then it binds only (and always) in the bad state,
resulting in a ﬂuctuating-wage equilibrium. Otherwise, the wage is constant after the ap-
prenticeship. Now, the natural question is under which conditions the employer’s bad-state
incentive constraint will bind. We address this next.
4. Conditions for wage-smoothing equilibria
In the case of a wage-smoothing agreement, the wage paid can be computed by substi-
tuting (4)00 and (10) into (5) with equality (setting the target utility W equal to f W ∗). This











20We will henceforth call this the ‘eﬃciency wage,’ and denote it by ω∗. This is clearly the
lowest wage that, if credibly promised to be paid at all dates in the future conditional on no
shirking, will induce the worker to apply eﬀort.
Here, we show that for given parameters if it is suﬃciently diﬃcult for an employer to
ﬁnd a new worker or if Y -sector output is suﬃciently cheap, the equilibrium involves wage
smoothing. Otherwise, it involves a ﬂuctuating wage.
First, note that the wage-smoothing agreement is preferred by the employer whenever it is
feasible (because with risk-averse workers, wage smoothing delivers the required incentives to
workers with a lower expected wage). Therefore, if we assume a wage-smoothing equilibrium
and then compute the values V ES and Ω(f W ∗) that it implies, we can check if in the bad
state employer’s incentive constraint (3) is satisﬁed. If it is, wage-smoothing will occur, and
otherwise, it will not.












ES + (1 − Q
E)βV
ES. (12)
Note in addition that:
Ω(f W
∗) =
x − ω∗ + (1 − ρ)βV ES
1 − ρβ
. (13)
If we substitute (13) into (12) and rearrange, we get:
V
ES =
QEρβ [x − ρβω∗ − (1 − ρβ)ωy]
(1 − β)[1 − (1 − QE)ρβ]
. (14)
It is easy to verify that this is increasing in QE and decreasing in ωy = py.
Now, the employer’s incentive constraint in the bad state is:
xB − ω
∗ + ρβΩ(f W
∗) + (1 − ρ)βV
ES > V
ES.
Using (13), this becomes:
xB − ω
∗ + ρβ(x − xB) > (1 − β)V
ES, or
21xB − ω
∗ + ρβπG(xG − xB) > (1 − β)V
ES. (15)
This condition allows us to identify the conditions under which wage smoothing will occur:
Proposition 3. For given py, there is a value QE
V V(py) ∈ [0,1], such that if QE < QE
V V(py)
a wage-smoothing equilibrium can be sustained, while if QE > QE
V V(py) it cannot. Further,
QE
V V(py) is decreasing in py.
Proof. The value QE
V V(py) can be deﬁned for any py as the solution for QE to:
xB − ω
∗ + ρβπG(xG − xB) = (1 − β)V
ES.
Taking total derivatives with respect to QE
V V(py) and py, using (11) and ωy = py to obtain
the derivative of ω∗ with respect to py, gives the result. Q.E.D.
The function QE
V V(py) is shown by the VV curve in Figure 1. Values of QE and py above
and to the right of this curve are points imply that equilibrium X-sector wages must be
volatile.
At this point it may be useful to review how the pieces ﬁt together. Workers in the X
sector are promised higher future wages in order to motivate current eﬀort. Thus, in a wage-
smoothing equilibrium, the worker is paid the opportunity wage ωy during the ‘apprenticeship’
of the ﬁrst period, and then the higher eﬃciency wage ω∗ thereafter. For this reason, an
incumbent worker is always more expensive than a new one, although they have the same
productivity. Employers in the X sector thus are always to some degree tempted to shirk
on their commitment to their incumbent workers and search instead for a new one; this
temptation is strongest in bad states when the worker’s productivity is low. If this temptation
is strong enough, the wage-smoothing equilibrium is untenable, because workers will know that
X-sector employers will not honor their promises. This happens when it is easy to ﬁnd a
new worker, or when QE is high. That is why points to the right of the VV curve imply
equilibrium with wage volatility.
22We turn to those ﬂuctuating-wage equilibria next.
5. Fluctuating wage equilibria
In a ﬂuctuating-wage equilibrium, the two state-dependant wages are determined by the
worker’s binding incentive-compatibility constraint and the employer’s binding bad-state
incentive constraint. This ﬁrst of these conditions can be simpliﬁed by substituting (4)00 and












In other words, (16) states that the expected utility promised to an X-sector worker in any
period after the ﬁrst must be enough to compensate that worker next period, in expected
value, for the current disutility of eﬀort. Equation (16) is represented in Figure 2 by the
downward-sloping curve WW. The ﬁgure measures the bad-state wage ωB on the vertical
axis and the good-state wage ωG on the horizontal axis. This curve is strictly convex due to
the worker’s risk aversion.




B + ρβΩ(f W
∗) + (1 − ρ)βV
ES = V
ES. (17)
Developing expressions for V ES and Ω(f W ∗) analogous to (14) and (13) and substituting
them into (17) yields the equation:
ωB =
−ρβπGωG + QEρβωy + xB + (1 − QE)ρβπG(xG − xB)
1 − ρβ(πG − QE)
, (18)
which is depicted in Figure 2 as the straight downward-sloping line EE.
The intersection of WW with the 45◦-line is the eﬃciency wage, ω∗, and any movement
along the WW curve toward that point represents an increase in the employer’s proﬁts,
23because it implies a lower expected wage. The downward-sloping line EE is the employer’s
incentive-compatibility constraint in the bad state. Any equilibrium pair of wages must lie
on or above WW and on or below EE. The employer will choose the wage combination that
minimizes expected wages, subject to the two constraints, and this amounts to choosing ω∗
if it is on or below EE, and choosing the intersection of EE and WW closest to the 45◦-line
otherwise.
We are focusing here on the ﬂuctuating-wage case, so by assumption, the constant-wage
outcome is not sustainable. Therefore, we know that the intersection of EE with the 45◦-line
occurs below the intersection of WW with the 45◦-line. Further, since we have shown (in
Proposition 2) that in equilibrium the good-state wage is never below the bad-state wage, the
two curves must intersect below the 45◦-line. Given the concavity of WW and the linearity
of EE, there will clearly be two such intersections,18 but the one that will be chosen by the
ﬁrm is the one closest to the 45◦-line, as shown, because it will oﬀer the lowest expected wage
consistent with the constraints. This means that at the point of intersection that determines
ωB and ωG, EE is ﬂatter than WW. As a result, it is clear that anything that shifts the EE
line down without shifting WW will raise ωG and lower ωB. In addition, it is useful to note
that, since the WW curve is a worker indiﬀerence curve, holding k constant, anything that
shifts down the WW line (whether or not it shifts the EE line) lowers worker welfare.
It can easily be veriﬁed by diﬀerentiating (18) that a rise in QE will shift the EE down.
Clearly, it has no eﬀect on WW. Therefore, we have the following:
Proposition 4. If the equilibrium has ﬂuctuating wages, an increase in QE holding ωy = py
18Of course, if the two curves do not intersect at all, no cooperation is possible. It will be shown that
this occurs in a portion of the parameter space to the right of curve BB in Figure 1. It is also possible that
the two curves are tangent, which occurs only on the curve BB, and thus in a zero-measure portion of the
parameter space. We focus our attention on the portions of the parameter space where EE and WW have
a non-vanishing region of intersection, as shown.
24constant will raise ωG and lower ωB, in the process raising average X-sector wages, but
having no eﬀect on worker welfare.
A rise in QE increases the volatility of X-sector wages, by making it easier to ﬁnd
a replacement worker and thus sharpening the temptation to renege on promises to an
incumbent worker in a bad proﬁtability state. Thus, an improvement in the ease with which
an employer can ﬁnd a new worker has a negative indirect eﬀect on proﬁts in the form of
higher expected wages, in addition to the positive direct eﬀect.
At the same time, a rise in py will shift both curves upward. The WW curve shifts up
because the worker’s opportunity cost has risen. The EE curve shifts up because, for given
ωG and ωB, the rise in the workers’ opportunity cost lowers the degree to which new workers
are cheaper than incumbents (recall that a new worker is paid her opportunity wage ωy in
the ﬁrst period of employment). The net eﬀect on wages can be signed as follows.
Proposition 5. If the equilibrium has ﬂuctuating wages, an increase in py will raise ωG and
lower ωB, in the process raising average X-sector wages and X-sector worker utility.
Proof. See appendix.
A rise in py increases the volatility of X-sector wages, by increasing the opportunity cost
of X-sector workers, which lowers the joint surplus available to a worker and employer in
the X sector and also lowers the share of the surplus that can be captured by the employer.
This sharpens the employer’s incentive-compatibility constraints. Note the striking force of
the sharpened incentive constraint: Even though the worker’s opportunity wage increases,
the wage paid by an X employer in the bad state falls. This is because the employer’s
temptation to cheat is strongest in the bad state, and that temptation is increased by the
rise in the worker’s opportunity cost.
These results can be summarized in Figure 1 by observing that any movement up and
25to the right from a point above the locus VV must result in an increase in wage volatility.
Further, any movement upward will raise the welfare of workers in both sectors, while any
horizontal movement will leave worker welfare unchanged.
Note that if QE and py are close to the VV curve in Figure 1, ω∗
G is close to ω∗
B, so
xG−ω∗
G > xB −ω∗
B. Further, from Proposition 4, as we increase QE holding py constant, ω∗
G
rises and ω∗
B falls, so that either we reach the limit QE = 1 with the inequality xG − ω∗
G >
xB − ω∗
B still true, or there exists a value QE
BB(py) such that xG − ω∗
G = xB − ω∗
B at that
value of QE and xG −ω∗
G < xB −ω∗
B for higher values. The function QE
BB(py) is represented
in Figure 1 by the curve BB. Clearly, the employer’s incentive-compatibility constraint will
bind in both states if and only if the QE and py combination lies on the curve BB. Further,
by Propositions 4 and 5, BB must be downward-sloping.
We can now use the process of elimination to characterize equilibrium at each point
in Figure 1. By Proposition 3, any point below VV implies wage smoothing. Any point
between VV and BB implies wage volatility, with the employer’s constraint binding in the
bad state but not in the good state. Any point on BB implies wage volatility with the
employer’s constraint binding in both states. Any point to the right of BB implies that
equilibrium with X-sector production requires the employer’s constraint to bind in the good
state but not in the bad state, which by Proposition 2 is impossible. Therefore, under our
assumptions it is not possible to have an equilibrium with X production under all states for
points to the right of BB.
Of course, in general equilibrium QE and py are both endogenous. We turn to this in
the next section, which allows us to analyze the full equilibrium and how it changes with
globalization.
266. General equilibrium, and the Eﬀects of Globalization
Suppose that we now have two countries. Call the ﬁrst the ‘US’ and the second ‘India.’







so that workers are relatively abundant in India.
There are three possible states to concern us: Autarky, in which there is no integration
of goods or factor markets; free trade, in which goods markets but not factor markets are
integrated; and full integration, in which both goods and factor markets are integrated.
We will call the movement from the second to the third of these states ‘oﬀshoring,’ since it
simply means that now employers in one country are free to hire workers from another. Thus,
globalization conceptually has two distinct components, and we will see that the eﬀects of
trade per se on wage volatility are very diﬀerent from the eﬀects of oﬀshoring.
First, we will consider the steady state under autarky, which here means simply that
American employers can match only with American workers; Indian employers can match
only with Indian workers; and in each country, the quantities of each good produced must
be equal to the quantities consumed.
We need to derive the equilibrium value of QE. Recall that the total number of employers
searching for a worker in any one period is denoted m, the total number of workers search-
ing for a new X-sector employer is denoted n, and in any period Φ(n,m) matches occur.
Therefore, the fraction of searching employers who ﬁnd workers is QE =
Φ(n,m)
m = Φ( n
m,1),
hence an increasing function of n
m. The steady-state level of searching employers therefore












27The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side represents vacancies for which no worker was found; the
second represents ﬁrms currently with workers who are exogenously separated from them;
and the last term represents ﬁrms that ﬁnd a worker to ﬁll a vacancy but are immediately
exogenously separated from them.
This can be simpliﬁed to:















This can be used to show the following.
Proposition 6. For any value of E
L, the steady-state value of n
m and hence QE is uniquely
determined. We can thus write QE(E
L). Further, QE(E
L) is strictly decreasing.
Proof. See appendix.
Thus, holding other parameters constant, when workers are more scarce, it is more diﬃ-
cult for an employer to ﬁnd one to match with.
Next, we need to determine py. For this, given the identical and homothetic demands
held by consumers in both countries, it will be suﬃcient to determine relative supplies of the
two goods:
Proposition 7. Under autarky, the steady-state supply of X output is an increasing and
linear homogeneous function of E and L, while the steady-state supply of Y output is
decreasing in E, increasing in L, and linear homogeneous in E and L. Therefore, the
relative supply of Y -sector output, r, is a decreasing function of E
L, and the relative price py
of Y -sector output is an increasing function of E
L.
28Proof. See appendix.
Propositions 6 and 7 can be illustrated with the help of Figure 3, which is the same as
Figure 1 except for the addition of the downward-sloping curve MM. This curve gives the
combinations of QE and py obtained in an autarkic economy by varying E
L over the positive
real line.19 The MM curve is, then, the locus of market-clearing values that complete the
general equilibrium in the autarkic case. The fact that QE is decreasing in E
L while py is
increasing guarantees that MM must indeed be downward-sloping. In other words, from the
top left-hand of the MM curve to the bottom right-hand end, we move from labor-scarce
economies (with high E
L), where the labor-intensive good is expensive and it is diﬃcult to
ﬁnd a worker, to labor-abundant ones.20
Note that as goods X and Y become very close substitutes, MM becomes arbitrarily ﬂat,
19More precisely, for a given value of E
L for an autarkic economy, we can ﬁnd the steady-state value of
QE (as in Proposition 6) and the steady-state value of the ratio of Y to X supplied, hence the equilibrium
relative price py (as in Proposition 7). Tracing out the QE and py values so generated produces the MM
curve as we vary E
L.
20We can now also clarify the conditions under which (i) it is optimal to elicit eﬀort in all states, and (ii)
Assumption 1 holds. (i) In the region of the parameter space where the ﬁrm’s incentive constraints do not
bind, the optimal contracts we analyze are the same as would be chosen under full commitment. Therefore,
for points on or to the left of the VV curve, if it is optimal to elicit production under all states with full
commitment, it is also optimal without commitment, as in our model. A suﬃcient condition for this is that
ρβω∗ < xB. (ii) It is easy to verify that the wage-smoothing condition (15) is a strictly stronger condition
than Assumption 1, since the strictly higher worker target utility in the second and later periods of the
relationship, compared with the ﬁrst period, make it more likely that the employer’s incentive constraints
will bind. Therefore, for the whole length of the MM curve to the left of VV and for at least a segment of
positive length to the right of VV, Assumption 1 will be satisﬁed. If it is also true that at the intersection
of MM and VV, ρβω∗ < xB holds, then there is a segment of MM including its intersection with VV plus
some distance on both sides in which Assumption 1 and the assumption that it is always optimal to elicit
eﬀort are both satisﬁed. We assume this condition, and focus our attention on that segment.
29while as they approach the case of perfect complementarity it becomes arbitrarily steep.21
Therefore, the MM curve could be either ﬂatter or steeper than the VV curve. It has been
drawn ﬂatter in this case for concreteness.
Now, we have all of the tools required to analyze the eﬀects of globalization. First, we
consider the eﬀects of free trade, and then the eﬀects of oﬀshoring.
6.A. Free Trade
Free trade establishes a uniﬁed world market for goods X and Y , without allowing for
movements of labor across borders. Given Proposition 7, if autarkic supplies of the two goods
in the two countries are denoted Xi and Y i respectively for country i, then the relative supply
of Y will be equal to rUS ≡ Y US
XUS for the US under autarky; rIN ≡ Y IN
XIN > rUS for India under
autarky; and rFT ≡ Y US+Y IN
XUS+XIN > rUS under free trade (note that free trade does not change
the quantities produced in either country).22 As a result, the free-trade value of py will be
lower than the autarkic US value. This will lower the real wage ωy
P(py) =
py
P(py) for US workers
in the Y sector, and since US workers are indiﬀerent between working in the two sectors,
this also means that the steady-state welfare of US X-sector workers will fall. At the same
time, by Proposition 5, we know that the variance of wages will fall. To sum up, we have
the following:
Proposition 8. Free trade lowers the steady-state welfare of all US workers and raises the
21If the elasticity of substitution implied by the utility function U between X and Y is high, then a given
rise in E
L and consequent drop in r will require only a small change in the relative price py to restore market
clearing. Conversely, a low elasticity of substitution will require a large movement in relative price.
22As a result, we have gains from trade only through exchange, and not through specialization. We could
allow for output eﬀects by, for example allowing for workers to choose their search intensity. In this case, a
rise in the relative price of X-sector output would increase search intensity, raising the steady-state fraction
of workers with X-sector jobs and thereby the output of X. However, this is somewhat beside the point for
the issues we are dealing with.
30welfare of all workers in India. It also (weakly) lowers the variance of US wages and raises
the variance of wages in India.23
If the US economy is initially at point A in Figure 3, then from the point of view of
US workers this change is represented by the move from point A to point B. (Note that the
only reason for the qualiﬁer ‘weakly’ in the proposition is the possibility that one or both
countries may be in the wage smoothing regime both with and without trade.)
Note that this result is exactly in line with the empirical ﬁndings of Bertrand (2004).
Those results are not about the eﬀects of trade on economy-wide average wage volatility, but
rather inter-industry comparisons of wage volatility across time. Bertrand ﬁnds a positive
cross-industry correlation between increases in an industry’s import penetration ratio and
weakening of its invisible handshake. In our model, the X industry’s import penetration
falls with the opening of trade (it goes from zero to a negative value, since the X industry
is a net exporter), and in that industry the invisible handshake is strengthened, in line with
the Bertrand ﬁnding. Obviously, we could extend the model to have several career sectors,
some of them import-competing, and similar logic would continue to hold.
23We have assumed throughout that US and Indian workers have the same productivity for simplicity.
Therefore, as a referee has pointed out, given the risk premium, average wages are higher in India under
free trade than in the United States. More realistically, we could allow for US workers to be much more
productive than Indian ones, in which case the wage that each Indian worker receives will be lower than
its US counterpart even with the higher risk premium. Of course, this would complicate everything in the
model, without changing the results of interest such as this proposition. Since the eﬀects of diﬀerent labor
productivities on international income distribution are well understood, we have stayed away from this in
the actual modelling.
316.B. Oﬀshoring
Now, suppose that in addition to free trade we allow oﬀshoring to occur. In that case we
have arrived at full integration; the two economies will combine to form one large one with
E + E∗ employers and L + L∗ workers.
Since full integration essentially creates an autarkic economy with E + E∗ employers
and L + L∗ workers, comparing full integration with autarky is straightforward. The ratio
E+E∗
L+L∗ necessarily falls between E
L and E∗
L∗, so, again by Proposition 7, the free-trade value
of py will be lower than the autarkic US value and above the autarkic Indian value. Thus,
it is immediate that full integration has qualitatively the same eﬀect on worker welfare in
both countries, compared to autarky, as does free trade; US workers are worse-oﬀ under full
integration than under autarky, while Indian workers are better-oﬀ. However, what is not
straightforward is the marginal eﬀect of oﬀshoring on worker welfare, in other words, the
diﬀerence in worker welfare between free trade and full integration. It can be shown that
this eﬀect is positive, for workers in both countries.24
Proposition 9. The world relative supply of good Y , r, is lower under full integration than
under free trade. Therefore, the relative price, py, is higher, and the welfare of workers in
both countries is higher, under full integration than under free trade.
Proof. See appendix.
24To simplify the analysis, we have assigned all bargaining power to the employer. It is interesting to
speculate how this result would change if the workers also had some bargaining power, which would add
enormous complexity to the model. One point is clear, however: We have shown that the worker’s threat
point is improved by allowing oﬀshoring, because by raising the relative price of good Y , it raises the value of
the worker’s outside option (producing Y ). Thus, the worker’s bargaining position relative to the employer
is strengthened by oﬀshoring. This surprising result, running counter to the intuitive expectation of many
observers, is a reminder of the importance of working through the general equilibrium ramiﬁcations of the
change.
32This change is represented by the move from point B to point C in Figure 3. The
point (which is quite similar to a ﬁnding in Mitra and Ranjan (2007)) is that oﬀshoring
allows for eﬃciencies in the matching of X-sector employers in the labor-scarce US market
with workers in the worker-rich Indian market, thus allowing for the world X industry to
increase its employment and output.25 More workers worldwide producing X also means
fewer workers worldwide producing Y , so the world relative supply of Y falls, making Y
relatively more expensive. This beneﬁts workers producing Y , raising the opportunity cost
of X-sector workers, and raising workers’ equilibrium utility in both countries.
Further, from Proposition 6 it is clear that QE rises in the US. From Propositions 4 and
5, the rise in py and in QE together imply an increase in the volatility of US X-sector wages.
Thus, oﬀshoring does indeed increase the variance of US workers’ earnings, even though we
have just seen from the previous proposition that their welfare also rises. This implies that
in response to oﬀshoring expected X-sector wages in the US go up by more than enough to
compensate for the additional risk.26
Finally, a comment on the overall eﬀects of globalization, the movement from point A
to C in Figure 3. Note that the eﬀects of free trade and oﬀshoring on wage volatility run
in opposite directions, and the net eﬀect of globalization on wage volatility is therefore
not obvious. That it is truly ambiguous can be seen from the ﬁgure. If the elasticity of
25To see this more clearly, consider the following two extreme cases. In the ﬁrst one assume that employer-
labor ratio is the same in both countries, e.g. E
L = E
∗
L∗ . Then, when we integrate the labor markets, the world
total production of X and Y does not change after integration since the integrated economy’s employer-labor
ratio does not change. In the second extreme case, assume that US economy consists of only employers and
Indian economy consists of only workers. Once we integrate the labor markets, world X production goes
from zero to some positive amount. The case we consider in this model is in between these two cases such
that X production increases unlike the ﬁrst case but the amount of the increase in X is not as much as the
second case.
26The eﬀect of oﬀshoring on the volatility of wages in India is ambiguous, as QE and py move in opposite
directions. However, it deﬁnitely raises Indian workers’ utility.
33substitution between X and Y consumption is very high, the MM curve will be ﬂatter
than the VV curve as shown, while if the elasticity is very low, it will be steeper. In the
former case, it is possible that globalization takes the US from a point on MM in the wage-
smoothing regime (in other words, to the left of VV), to a point on MM in the ﬂuctuating-
wage regime. In the latter case, the opposite is possible. More generally, the elasticity of
substitution between X and Y in consumption will govern whether price eﬀects or QE eﬀects
will dominate. This provides our ﬁnal result.
Proposition 10. If the elasticity of substitution between X and Y consumption is suﬃ-
ciently small, globalization on balance lowers the volatility of US wages. If it is suﬃciently
large, it raises the volatility of US wages.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have joined some insights from labor economics with tools from contract
theory and international trade theory to examine the impact of globalization on implicit
contracts. We have shown that globalization can indeed aﬀect the nature of long-term
employment relationships, and in particular the volatility of workers’ incomes within those
relationships. By extension, these eﬀects can inﬂuence the degree of income inequality among
workers with identical characteristics, an important matter empirically that conventional
trade models cannot address.
However, it is important to note that diﬀerent types of globalization have quite diﬀerent
eﬀects. We have focused on two kinds of globalization: Free trade (or integration of goods
markets) and international oﬀshoring (or integration of labor markets). In our model, we ﬁnd
that free trade strengthens implicit contracts for rich-country workers, lowering the volatility
of workers’ incomes, but lowering their welfare due to relative-price eﬀects. On the other
hand, international oﬀshoring weakens implicit contracts for rich-country workers, raising
34the volatility of workers’ incomes, but raising their welfare due to relative-price eﬀects, as
the improved productivity of the oﬀshoring sector leads to a lower price for its output.
More generally, globalization aﬀects implicit contracts through two channels. Relative-
price changes will tend to strengthen implicit contracts and lower wage volatility in sectors
whose relative price rises, and have the opposite eﬀect in sectors whose relative price falls.
Thus, trade liberalization will tend to raise wage volatility in import-competing sectors and
lower it in export sectors. At the same time, in any industry if it becomes easier for an
employer to ﬁnd a new worker (because the employer can now hire foreign workers as well
as local ones), implicit contracts will be weakened, and if it becomes harder (because the
employer must now compete with foreign employers), implicit contracts will be strengthened.
Thus, holding relative prices ﬁxed, oﬀshoring will tend to raise wage volatility in the sectors
that exhibit positive net oﬀshoring and lower it in sectors that exhibit negative net oﬀshoring
(with foreign employers on balance hiring more domestic workers than vice versa, a case often
called ‘insourcing’). Further, oﬀshoring itself can give rise to relative-price eﬀects due to
improved productivity in the oﬀshoring sector, and to the extent that this raises the relative
price for labor-intensive industries, it can in general equilibrium provide an indirect welfare
beneﬁt to workers in all countries.
Thus, we simultaneously formalize and sharply limit one argument on the dangers of
globalization.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. First, observe that since a worker will never accept employment with
payoﬀ below V WS, we must have Wmin ≥ V WS. We will show that Wmin = V WS by showing
through contradiction that it is not possible to have Wmin > V WS. First, however, it will
be useful to demonstrate that Wmin ≤ f W ∗, which will allow us to ignore the constraint
Wmin ≤ f W and treat (9) as an equality.
35Suppose, then, that Wmin > f W ∗. In this case, the worker’s incentive constraint (4)0 can
never bind, and so υ = 0 for  = G,B. Consider the ﬁrst-period decision. Then if the
lower-bound constraint in (6) does not bind for state , then the ﬁrst-order condition (9)
holds with equality, so from (9), we have −λ = Ω0(W0) ≤ Ω0(f W) < 0, so W0 ≥ f W > Wmin.
But this would be a suboptimal choice by the employer, as the employer could choose a
ﬁrst-period wage and future worker payoﬀs to give the worker a current payoﬀ W0 equal to
Wmin; this would realize a higher proﬁt, and would also satisfy the ﬁrst-period target utility
constraint (5) since Wmin ≥ V WS. Therefore, we conclude that the lower-bound constraint
in (6) must bind in the ﬁrst-period decision for both states, and so f W = Wmin for  = G,B.
Now, suppose that the target utility constraint (5) binds in the ﬁrst period, recalling that the
ﬁrst-period target utility level W is equal to V WS. This immediately yields a contradiction,
as it implies that a worker payoﬀ of V WS can be realized in equilibrium, which contradicts
the maintained assumption that Wmin > f W ∗(since f W ∗ > V WS). Therefore, the target utility
constraint does not bind in the ﬁrst period, and so λ = 0. But then the ﬁrst-order condition
(8) for the wage cannot be satisﬁed for any positive value of the wage, implying a wage of
zero in the ﬁrst period in both states. This implies a ﬁrst-period payoﬀ for the worker equal
to:
µ(0) − k + ρβWmin + (1 − ρ)βV WS
≤ µ(0) − k + βWmin
< Wmin.
The ﬁrst inequality follows since Wmin > V WS and the second inequality follows since Wmin
cannot be less than
µ(0)
1−β (which is the utility from permanent zero consumption; in no case
could the worker receive lower utility than that).
But this is a contradiction, since by deﬁnition it is not possible to give a worker a payoﬀ
less than Wmin. Therefore, Wmin ≤ f W ∗. As a result, the constraint Wmin ≤ f W is redundant,
and can be removed without changing the solution. Consequently, we can treat (9) as an
36equality.
Now, suppose that Wmin > V WS. Then if the target utility constraint (5) binds in the
ﬁrst period, recalling that the ﬁrst-period target utility level W is equal to V WS, then we
have a contradiction as before, so suppose that the target utility constraint does not bind in
the ﬁrst period. Then λ = 0, so the ﬁrst-order condition (8) for the wage cannot be satisﬁed
for any positive value of the wage, implying a wage of zero in the ﬁrst period in both states.
Note that with λ = 0, the ﬁrst-order condition (9) cannot be satisﬁed with equality unless
υ > 0, so that the workers’ incentive constraint binds, and so f W = f W ∗. (We already
know that the lower-bound constraint in (6) is redundant, because we have shown above
that Wmin ≤ f W ∗.) This implies a ﬁrst-period payoﬀ for the worker equal to:
µ(0) − k + ρβf W ∗ + (1 − ρ)βV WS
= µ(0) + V WS − µ(ωy
P )
< Wmin.
Of course, again, this is a contradiction, by the deﬁnition of Wmin. We conclude that Wmin ≤
V WS < f W ∗. Since we already know that Wmin ≥ V WS, we conclude that Wmin = V WS.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the second-period problem. Under conditions of Propo-
sition 1, we know that the target continuation payoﬀ for the worker is f W ∗. We claim that
the choice of next-period continuation payoﬀ f W will be equal to f W ∗ for  = G,B. If υ > 0,
then complementary slackness implies that f W = f W ∗. Therefore, suppose that υ = 0. This
implies that (9) becomes:
Ω




Since, by the envelope theorem, −λ = Ω0(W), and as we recall for the second-period problem
the worker’s target utility W = f W ∗, this becomes:
Ω






37If ψ = 0, this implies through the strict concavity of Ω that f W = f W ∗, and we are done.
On the other hand, if ψ > 0, (21) then implies that 0 > Ω0(f W) > Ω0(f W ∗), implying that
f W < f W ∗. However, this violates (4)00. Therefore, all possibilities either imply that f W = f W ∗
or lead to a contradiction, and the claim is proven.
Since f W = f W ∗, the optimization problem in the third period of the relationship is
identical to that of the second period. By induction, the target utility for the worker in
every period after the ﬁrst, regardless of history, is equal to f W ∗, and so the wage chosen for
each state in every period after the ﬁrst, regardless of history, is the same.
Now, to establish the three possible outcomes, we consider each possible case in turn.
Consider the optimization problem (2) at any date after the ﬁrst period of relationship.
First, suppose that the employer’s constraint does not bind in either state. In this case,






If this holds with strict inequality for some , then ω = 0. This clearly cannot be true for
both values of , because that would imply a permanent zero wage, and it would not be
possible to satisfy (5). (To see this, formally, substitute W = f W ∗, the expression for V WS,
and ωG = ωB = 0 into (5), and note that the constraint is violated.) Therefore, for at most








P . However, given that ω00 is non-negative and µ is strictly
concave, this is impossible. We conclude that (22) must hold with equality in both states,
and therefore ωG = ωB.
Next, suppose that we have ψG > 0 and ψB = 0, so that the employer’s constraint binds
only in the good state. We will show that this leads to a contradiction. Recall from the
previous proposition that f W = f W ∗ for both states, and note that, by assumption, (3) is
satisﬁed by equality for  = G. Since xB < xG, we now see that (3) must be violated for
38 = B if ωG ≤ ωB. Therefore, ωG > ωB ≥ 0. This implies that (8) holds with equality in the






















which contradicts the requirement that ωG > ωB. This shows that it is not possible for the
employer’s constraint to bind in the good state.
Now suppose that we have ψG = 0 and ψB > 0, so that the employer’s constraint binds
only in the bad state. We now wish to prove that in this case ωG > ωB. Suppose to the
contrary that ωG ≤ ωB. Since we already know that we cannot have a zero wage in both























which implies that ωG > ωB. Therefore, we have a contradiction, and we conclude that
ωG > ωB.
Finally, suppose that the employer’s constraint binds in both states. Given that f W = f W ∗
in both states, equality in both states for (3) requires that short-term proﬁts x − ω∗
 are
equal in the two states.
We have thus eliminated all possibilities aside from those listed in the statement of the
proposition. Q.E.D.































































Recalling that P(py) is the minimum expenditure required to obtain one unit of utility, given
that the price of Y is py, Shephard’s Lemma implies that
pyP0
P = αy, where αy is the share





























The EE curve is given by:
ρβπGωG + [1 − ρβ(πG − Q
E)]ωB = Q
Eρβω
y + xB + (1 − Q
E)ρβπG(xG − xB).
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> 0 is the determinant of the sys-



















The ﬁrst inequality holds because the condition deﬁning the WW curve implies that ωy <
πGωG + πBωB, and the second holds because the middle expression is a weighted average of
40µ0(
ωG
P ) and µ0(
ωB
























dpy < 0, (23) requires that
dωG
dpy > 0, and therefore
d(ωG−ωB)
dpy > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. The number of employers paired with a worker is equal to E−m,
and the number of workers paired with an employer is equal to L − n. These must always
be equal, so:
E − L = m − n.



















The right-hand side of (25) exceeds unity iﬀ n
m < 1. Since we are assuming that E > L, the
right-hand side of (25) clearly needs to be greater than unity, so n
m must be less than unity.
Therefore, at an equilibrium, the right-hand side of (25) is strictly decreasing in n
m, so the
equilibrium level of n
m is uniquely determined for a given value of E
L and ρ. Furthermore, n
m
is a locally decreasing function of E
L for given values of the other parameters.
Now, if E < L, a parallel argument can be developed by dividing through by n instead
of m and later by E instead of L. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. The number of employers producing output in period t is given
by:
E − mt = ρ[E − mt−1 + Φ(nt−1,mt−1)]. (26)
41The number of employers producing output is equal to E−mt = L−nt. Denote aggregate
X-sector output in period t by xt. Since the average output of a functioning ﬁrm is equal to
x, the number of employers producing output must also equal xt





























E − 1) = 1 − ρ. (28)
Thus, xss(E,L) is increasing in E and L and linear homogenous in E, L. Now note that
Y -sector output can be written as:




where yt is the output in the Y sector in period t. In steady state, this can be rewritten as
follows:




Thus, from the properties just derived for xss, we see that yss(E,L) is increasing in L and
decreasing in E and linear homogenous in E, L.
As a result, r ≡
yss
xss is decreasing in E
L. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9. Recall from Proposition 7 that the steady-state values of X and
Y output within one country can be written as functions xss(E,L) and yss(E,L) of E and
42L. We can thus speak of the isoquants of these functions. For example, the slope of the xss












xssL − 1, x
xssE − 1)
ΦL( x




















xssE is increasing in E
L.
Therefore, the absolute value of the slope of the isoquant is smaller in a more labor-
scarce economy. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which depicts a box whose height is the
world supply of workers and whose length is the world supply of employers. In the ﬁgure,
the US endowment of workers and employers is measured upward and rightward respectively
from the lower left-hand origin, and India’s endowments are similarly measured down and
to the left from the upper right-hand origin. The allocation of the two factors between
the two countries is given by the point a; the xss isoquant for the US going through that
point is marked UU; and the xss isoquant for India going through that point is marked
II. The ﬁnding that the absolute slope of the isoquant for a given country is decreasing in
that country’s E
L ratio implies that these isoquants are strictly convex, and in addition, at
every possible allocation point below the main diagonal OUSOIN, UU is ﬂatter than the
corresponding Indian isoquant at that point.
Now under free trade without integration of factor markets, consider the change in Y
output if we transfer workers from India to the US, at the same time reallocating employers
from the US to India so that steady-state X output in the US is unchanged. This can be
43represented as a movement left along UU from point a. Suppose that we stop the process
when the E
L ratio in the two countries is the same (and therefore equal to the world E
L ratio).
In other words, we stop at point b. Since the US steady-state X isoquant is ﬂatter than the
Indian one at every point along this process, the movement from a to b results in an increase
in X output in India, and therefore in the world. Given (29), this implies a reduction in
worldwide Y output, and hence a reduction in r. Finally note that, under free trade, a
reallocation of workers and employers across countries that results in the same factor ratio
in each country – as for example in point b or any other point on the main diagonal – will
replicate the outcome of integration of the labor markets. Q.E.D.
References
References
[1] Amiti, Mary and Shang-Jin Wei (2005). “Fear of service outsourcing: is it justiﬁed?”
Economic Policy, 20:42 (April), pp. 308-347.
[2] —— (2006). “Service Oﬀshoring and Productivity: Evidence from the United States.”
NBER Working Paper No. 11926 (January).
[3] Antr` as, Pol, Luis Garicano and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (2006). “Oﬀshoring in a Knowl-
edge Economy.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121:1 (February), pp.31-77.
[4] Beaudry, Paul and John DiNardo (1991). “The Eﬀects of Implicit Contracts on the Be-
havior of Wages over the Business Cycle.” Journal of Political Economy, 99:4 (August),
pp. 665-688.
44[5] Bertrand, Marianne (2004). “From the Invisible Handshake to the Invisible Hand? How
Import Competition Changes the Employment Relationship.” Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics, 22:4 (October), pp. 723-765.
[6] Feenstra, Robert C. and Gordon H. Hanson (1996). “Foreign Investment, Outsourcing
and Relative Wages.” In R.C. Feenstra, G.M. Grossman and D.A. Irwin, eds., The
Political Economy of Trade Policy: Papers in Honor of Jagdish Bhagwati, Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, pp. 89-127.
[7] Gosselin, Peter G. (2004). “If America Is Richer, Why Are Its Families So Much Less
Secure?” Los Angeles Times, October 24.
[8] Gottschalk, Peter, Robert Moﬃtt, Lawrence F. Katz, and William T. Dickens (1994).
“The Growth of Earnings Instability in the U.S. Labor Market.” Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity 1994:2, pp. 217-272.
[9] Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research (2004). “National Public Radio Frequency Ques-
tionnaire: March 12-14.”
[10] Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman (2005). “Outsourcing in a Global Economy.”
Review of Economic Studies, 72:1 (January), pp. 135-159.
[11] Grossman, Gene M. and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (2006). “Trading Tasks: A Simple
Theory of Oﬀshoring.” NBER Working Paper No. 12721 (December).
[12] Hacker, Jacob S. (2004). “False Positive: The So-Called Good Economy.” The New
Republic, August 16 and 23.
[13] Holstein, William J. (2005). “Job Insecurity, From the Chief Down.” New York Times,
March 27.
45[14] Kocherlakota, Narayana R. (1996). “Implications of Eﬃcient Risk Sharing without Com-
mitment.” Review of Economic Studies, 63:4 (October), pp. 595-609.
[15] Krishna, Pravin and Mine Zeynep Senses (2009). “International Trade and Labor In-
come Risk in the United States.” NBER Working Paper No. 14992 (May).
[16] Lazear, Edward P. (1979), “Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?” Journal of Political
Economy, 87:6 (December), pp. 1261-1284.
[17] Levine, Robert A. (2006). “Globalization’s grave challenges for the West: An economic
time bomb.” The International Herald Tribune, May 10, p. 6.
[18] MacLeod, W. Bentley and James M. Malcomson (1989). “Implicit Contracts, Incentive
Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment.” Econometrica, 57:2 (March), pp. 447-
480.
[19] Malcomson, James M. (1999). “Individual Employment Contracts.” Chapter 35 of O.
Ashenfelter and D. Card, eds., The Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, Amsterdam:
Elsevier, pp. 2291-2372.
[20] Mann, Catherine L. (2003). “Globalization of IT Services and White Collar Jobs: The
Next Wave of Productivity Growth.” Institute for International Economics: Interna-
tional Economics Policy Brief PB03-11 (December).
[21] Mataloni, Raymond J. (2004). “A Note on Patterns of Production and Employment by
U.S. Multinational Companies.” Survey of Current Business, 84:3 (March), pp. 52-56.
[22] Matusz, Steven J. (1985). “The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model with Implicit Con-
tracts.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100:4 (November), pp.1313-1329.
[23] —— (1986). “Implicit Contracts, Unemployment and International Trade.” Economic
Journal, 96:382 (June), pp.307-322.
46[24] McDonald, J. T. and C. Worswick (1999). “Wages, Implicit Contracts and the Busi-
ness Cycle: Evidence from Canadian Micro Data.” Journal of Political Economy, 107:4
(August), pp. 884-892.
[25] McLaren, John and Andrew Newman (2004). “Globalization and Insecurity.” Mimeo:
University of Virginia.
[26] Meyerson, Harold (2006). “A call for a kinder, gentler capitalism.” Pittsburgh Tribune
Review, January 15.
[27] Mitra, Devashish and Priya Ranjan (2007). “Oﬀshoring and Unemployment.” NBER
Working Paper 13149 (June).
[28] Pissarides, Christopher (2000). Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. (2nd edition). Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
[29] Ramey, Garey and Joel Watson (2001). “Bilateral Trade and Opportunism in a Match-
ing Market.” Contributions to Theoretical Economics, 1:1.
[30] Rodrik, Dani (1997). Has Globalization Gone Too Far? Washington, DC.: Institute for
International Economics.
[31] Scheve, Kenneth F. and Matt Slaughter (2004). “Economic Insecurity and the Glob-
alization of Production.” American Journal of Political Science, 48:4 (October), pp.
662-674.
[32] Sennett, Richard (2006). The Culture of the New Capitalism. New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press.
[33] Shleifer, Andrei and Lawrence H. Summers (1988). “Breach of Trust in Hostile
Takeovers.” In Alan J. Auerbach, ed., Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences,
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 33-56.
47[34] Sijabat, Ridwan Max (2006). “Outsourcing Still ‘Slavery’ to Unions.” Jakarta Post, May
11, p.9.
[35] Spencer, Barbara J. (2005). “Presidential Address: International Outsourcing and In-
complete Contracts.” Canadian Journal of Economics, 38:4 (November), pp. 1107-1135.
[36] Thomas, Jonathan and Tim Worrall (1988). “Self-enforcing Wage Contracts,” Review
of Economic Studies, 55:4 (October), pp. 541-554.
[37] Traca, Daniel (2005). “Globalization, Wage Volatility and the Welfare of Workers,”
Review of International Economics, 13:2 (May), pp. 237-249.
[38] Uchitelle, Louis (2005). “Were the Good Old Days That Good?” The New York Times,
July 3, Section 3, p. 1.
[39] —— (2006). The Disposable American: Layoﬀs and Their Consequences. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf.
[40] Valletta, Robert G. (1999). “Declining Job Security.” Journal of Labor Economics, 17:4,
pt.2 (October), pp. S170-S197.
[41] Zeile, William J. (2003). “U.S. Aﬃliates of Foreign Companies.” Survey of Current
Business, 83:8 (August), pp. 38-56, Bureau of Economic Analysis.





















Figure 1: Type of Wage Contract







































Figure 4: Effect of international outsourcing.
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